threatening or traumatic events. As new services develop, and new understandings become widespread, so systematically collected data that allows for a consideration of the factors affecting post-traumatic stress disorder and its most effective form oftreatment will prove to be of paramount worth.
The unique feature of our evaluative work has been the extent and range of our assessments of posttraumatic symptoms, personality, exposure, and treatment outcome. Although detailed analysis ofthis data is still to be done it has been of major value to our continuing service. These assessments combined with therapists' shared experiences have led to continued refinement of therapeutic approach and service planning. An evolution of knowledge and specialization that along with the shared developments of our national and international colleagues will, we hope, ensure better responses to future disaster. This author was involved in a number of ways after the Piper Alpha disaster, including working in the Accident & Emergency Department and in the Burns Unit of Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, on a fire-fighting ship, and with police officers during the exercise for the retrieval of bodies from the accommodation modules of the Piper Alpha.
The Piper Alpha installation Owned by the petroleum company Occidental, the Piper Alpha installation was located in the North Sea, 120 miles north-east of Aberdeen. It housed a community of about 200 men, many of whom were used to working in harsh and uncompromising conditions. Inevitably, their being confined to the rig for extended periods led to the development of a community spirit among men.
The disaster
The world's worst oil rig disaster began about 22.00 h on Wednesday, 6 July 1988, with an initial explosion which was to serve as a trigger for a series of explosions which culminated in the almost complete destruction of the installation above sea-level, including the main control room and the generator and power distribution system, with the resultant disabling ofthe essential and emergency services (including the emergency lighting and gas/fire detection systems). Moreover, all telecommunications and the internal and external alarm systems were incapacitated.
The launching ofthe lifeboats and survival craft was made impossible by the inferno on the deck area, therefore, almost half of the crew mustered in the large accommodation module to await evacuation by helicopterthe recognized plan for escape. The unremitting fire and smoke prevented the arrival of helicopters, with the result that the men who remained in the module succumbed to smoke and toxic fumes, before the platform collapsed into the sea. The majority ofthose who survived had been working in open deck areas and elected to effect their own escape either by jumping into the sea (in some cases from about 100 feet), or by clambering down the external superstructure. Few would ever regard the North Sea as an attractive refuge but, on that night, it was even less inviting because large areas of it were ablaze with gas-and oil-fuelled fire. Some of the men sustained serious injuries during their escape or whilst waiting on the platform for the rescue craft. These injuries (serious burns to the hands in particular) made it very diffilcult for the men to clamber aboard the stand-by vessels: a fact which added greatly to their suffering.
The men were faced in-the early stages with fire, smoke and toxic fumes, and there was much confusion and uncertainty, for example whether they should follow their instincts or the training procedures. Much frustration and anguish was also caused by the fact that, although rescue facilities were in sight, the craft could not approach close enough to effect a straightforward rescue.
Many of the men reported a profound sense of helplessness and despair because of the lack of 0141-0768/91/ 010008-04/02.00/0 © 1991 The Royal fire-fighting and other facilities on the Piper Alpha, and the conflagration, as well as the sights of the injured and dead, created a thoroughly distressing scene. It should also be remembered how isolated the men felt so far from shore and land-based emergency personnel; not for them were there the reassuring sounds of klaxons of the¢emergency services. Ofthe 226 men originally on board the Piper Alpha, 164 were killed and one subsequently died in hospital. Two men in a rescue vessel also lost their lives while trying to rescue others. All survivors (of whom only 22 were local men) were taken first to Aberdeen Royal Infirmary where 21 were admitted for inpatient care. The majority of men suffered burns, particularly to the head, face and hands.
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Medicine
Psychiatric response
The psychiatric response was part ofthe overall initial emergency plan, the principal features of which are shown in Table 1 .
The initial response ofthe psychiatric services was made by a small team of senior and experienced clinicians, all ofwhom had had considerable experience of dealing with crises and trauma. The team comprised two consultant psychiatrists from the National Health Service (Drs Fowlie and Le Poidevin), and two staff from the University Department of Mental Health, Professor Ashcroft and the author. Their contribution aimed to be: (a) low key and undramatic, (b) readily available and flexible (ie, able to bring in other staff as required), (c) credible and realistic, and (d) reactive and proactive (eg identifying those at risk). The team's first base was a room in the Accident & Emergency Department at Aberdeen Royal Infirmary, quickly provided by the staff and managers.
The psychiatric team were most actively concerned with survivors and the police. However, Dr Fowlie and the author provided a consultation service for Occidental, who sought their opinion on a range of issues, including those pertaining to the retrieval of bodies and the timing of events such as memorial services. Furthermore, Dr Le Poidevin made a special contribution to the provisions for the bereaved by virtue of his position as Chairman ofthe local branch of CRUSE.
Accident & Emergency Department
Survivors' problems ranged from basic ones (such as wanting to know how to contact their families or when they were going to be discharged) to a florid toxic, confusional state. Most, however, just wanted 'a chat'.
The informal and friendly approach by the team appeared to have impotant longer term consequences, eg by defusing survivors' and their families' anxieties about psychiatric contact, and many survivors have maintained their links with members of the team.
After the initial crisis had abated, the author spent time meeting some of the nursing staff. A few found -dealing with burns upsetting and distasteful. For others, the disaster work highlighted latent doubts about their motivation for nursing, and exacerbated longstanding problems between themselves and other colleagues. Only in the minority of cases, therefore, was the disaster per se the direct cause ofthe nurses' distress.
Two further observations are worth making. The first is that staff who had the most difficult time adapting to the consequences of the disaster were those who had gone off duty immediately the initial surge of admissions had been completed. They missed out on the inormal debriefing and winding down. The second is that those who have a low profile in the course of their normal duties (eg, receptionists and telephonists) may be individuals at risk when a crisis develops, and their needs may go unnoticed.
Burns Unit
For the first couple of days there were obvious signs ofrelief and euphoria among the survivors. The mood in the ward changed, however, as the death toll increased (particularly when one ofthe survivors died in the Infirmary), and bouts oftearfulness, irritability, generalized anxiety and anxiety caused by anticipation ofthe problems likely to be encountered on discharge became more common. They suffered badly from uncertainties, eg, if the theatre lists were changed or if their dates for discharge were not given with sufficient precision. Much ofthe time the psychiatric contribution entailed providing a sympathetic ear or a link between the survivors and their general practitioners and their regional psychiatric services.
Despite the survivors' difficulties, it was noticeable in the ward that they quickly emerged as a mutually supportive and cohesive group, and there was also a good deal of black humour and banter. The helpful impact ofthese factors lessened however as more men were discharged. It was hardest for the two men with the worst injuries when they were alone in the ward: much more support was required for them.
Paradoxically, the cohesiveness ofthe group and the good atmosphere they created in the ward had two unfortunate consequences. First, it made discharge for some a very threatening experience, and raised some various anxieties, such as 'will my children still love me when they see me?' and 'how can I face the wife of my friend who died?'. Second, nearly all the visiting professionals who came to the Infirmary to provide counsel and support forgot about another survivor who was alone in an orthopaedic ward, distracted from his needs by the attractive atmosphere in the Burns Unit.
Some months after the disaster, the author interviewed a number of the nurses. None reported any long-standing adverse reactions to her work following the disaster. At that time, however, several found it particularly 'gruelling' dealing with relatives' questions (particularly in the case of wives whose husband& were still missing). Some of the nurses found it difficult to unwind when they went offduty, and others felt guilty when they went off duty (despite the fact most worked longer than their required shifts). Clearly, there was a need for senior staff to take responsibility and send drained and overcommitted individuals off duty, without implying that these colleagues were in any way inadequate to their tasks.
The multi-functional support vessel, Tharos A few days after the disaster the author flew out to this vessel, which was fighting the fires on the remnants ofPiper Alpha, to assess what were reported to be 'stress problems' among some ofthe rescuers and fire fighters.
Along with a local general practitioner (who had been one of the first medical staff to be flown out) he interviewed over a dozen of the crew, including those who had reported that they were feeling distressed as well as those who were thought to be at risk (eg, those with a previous psychiatric history). All efforts were made to make these interviews as casual and relaxed as possible, despite the dramatic and unpleasant circumstances.
A few men reported 'flashbacks' of sights of burned faces and charred bodies; insomnia was quite common (although some of the men had worked for 32 hours non-stop), and one or two reported a generalized anxiety and 'tension'. Most admitted they could hardly absorb the full scale of the disaster and preferred to continue working, recognizing that it would 'hit' them when they went on shore. There was some survivor guilt but none reported feeling depressed.
Nearly all the rescuers wanted feedback about the welfare of their rescued colleagues. Because of the limited communication links unhelpful rumours flourished. In terms of psychiatric help, therefore, reassurance and facts were the mainstay. The men needed to be convinced that their emotional and physical reactions were within the bounds of normality, and that they were doing and had done a 'good job'. Frequent hospital bulletins about the survivors were soon relayed to the Tharos. The need for reassurance was not surprising since the Tharos had not been able to engage the fires immediately and, consequently, many of its crews had had to watch helplessly much of the suffering of their colleagues from the Piper Alpha, and the platform's disintegration. However, another factor which contributed to their need for reassurance was that one of the visiting 'experts' reported to the local press that a third ofthe rescuers would have serious psychological problems because of their efforts! Retrieval of bodies A temporary mortuary was set up in Aberdeen under the control of the Chief Constable, and manned by 51 officers (men and women). At that stage the psychiatric team was not directly involved but they had offered their services. Some months after the disaster, 105 bodies were still missing. Reports from divers and survivors suggested that many had been entombed in the accommodation modules, which lay in about 440 feet of water. After several postponements, the modules were raised and ferried by barge to the isolated island of Flotta in the Orkney archipelago. Delays because of the inclement weather and technical problems caused much distress to the families awaiting the remains of their loved ones, and some anticipatory anxiety among those responsible for the retrieval of the remains.
All individuals on site, irrespective of their duties and rank, were given an intensive 'induction', during which particular attention was paid to safety, hygiene, security and personal reactions (physical and emotional). It was indicated on that last occasion that two of the team (DAA and DF) would be 'around to see how things were going' and would be available if anybody wanted to have a word with them. (The word 'counselling' was not used.)
About 2 years prior to the disaster, the Police Foundation had commissioned an extensive survey into occupational health and stress in the Grampian Police Force. This was conducted by the author and two colleagues from the Medical School. Consequently, nearly all the officers working at the mortuary and at Flotta had taken part in that study, providing an invaluable and probably unique opportunity to make 'fore' and 'after' comparisons. Moreover, it was also possible to compare their well-being and performance with those of a matched control group of officers from the same Force who were not involved in such work. The results of this study will be presented elsewhere', but the preliminary evidence suggests that the police negotiated their duties successfully without long-term difficulties. None has taken time off work for what could be described as a stress-related illness, and none has been reported to be showing impaired work performance since returning to normal duties.
There seem to be a number of factors which may have reduced the occurrence of long-term adverse reactions. First, the operation was very professionally organized, and the men's needs were taken seriously. Second, the idea that this exercise was valuable and purposeful was heavily underlinedthroughout. Third, there was an excellent espirit de corps among the various workers. Finally, a number of them had devised their own highly effective coping strategies.
As one senior detective said to the author: 'Sir, when I go in there (the accommodation module) as far as I am concerned I'm going into a spaceship looking for Martians'.
Survivors' reunion
Because the men on Piper Alpha constituted a community, it was felt that this group spirit should be built on by organizing a reunion in December 1988.
It was held in a hotel in Aberdeen and the men's expenses were covered by the generosity of the local Council. Of the 59 known to have received an invitation only six declined to accept because they did not think attending such an event would have been helpful to them personally. The first evening was confined to survivors, and the various professional and lay groups who had been involved with the disaster were invited to meet the survivors on the following morning. The press were allowed to take only one photograph in the morning: no other media involvement on the premises was permitted.
With the individuals' permission the names and addrese of all survivors were circulated among those attending in the evening in order that they could trace some of their friends and colleagues.
Routine psychiatric work By means ofthe Aberdeen Psychiatric Case Register it has been possible to establish that out of 22 local survivors, 10 have been referred to either the local psychiatric or the clinical psychology services. Data are not yet available on those living outside the local area.
Have there been any lessons learned? In the so-called 'honeymoon' phase, the local and outside response to the disaster was as overwhelming as it was genuine, but organizing the response after a disaster has to be flexible because of needs which change over time. Key contributions ofthe individuals organizing the response include identifying new needs as they appear, locating and directing the sources of help which might meet these needs, obtaining good information about the overall circumstances, and disseminating this information to those who need it. Accurate information is essential; the aftermath of a disaster is a fertile breeding ground for unhelpful rumour and suspicion.
The organization must also be able to make the best use of outside experts. Their contribution can be considerable, but an intrusive presence is likely to be resented by local helpers. Their expertise should be used to facilitate and enhance the community response, but should not be allowed to inhibit or supplant it. This issue relates to the need to acknowledge differences among disasters. The men of Piper Alpha were not the same as, for instance, a heterogeneous assortment of passengers on a ferry. Moreover, one must consider idiosyncratic features of the local population. Generally the inhabitants of the north-east of Scotland are very reticent individuals to whom the public expression ofemotion, including suffering, is quite foreign. This has a marked bearing on what facilities and resources they will use.
In organizing the response, the provision ofcontinuity of care is essential. It is relatively easy to offer help at the early stages, but it is much harder to maintain a commitment as needs continue to grow or change. One of the sad features ofthis disaster was its prolongation by factors such as the retrieval of bodies, the demolition of the remnants of the installation, and accusation and counter-accusation (about matters pertaining to culpability, the payment of wages, the disbursal of the Disaster Fund, and the efficiency of the rescue operation), and the public inquiry.
As a feature of the organization it is important to have 'managers' at strategic phases or points in the intervention; individuals who have the authority to withdraw people when they have given enough or are in over-drive and running the risk of mental and physical exhaustion. For committed helpers it may be too much to expect that they should be able-to say for themselves 'enough is enough' because they are likely to misperceive this as their being weak or selfish.
One final comment about the organization of the response is that, particularly when help is offered to those who are themselves members of well-organized and professional groups (as was the case here, for example, with the divers and police officers), this offer of assistance itself must be well-organized and professional. There have to be concerns about the competence of some who are keen to offer 'counselling' after a disaster, however well intended these offers are. The word 'counselling' has now been so widely and inappropriately used that it runs the risk of becoming devoid of professional standing. Naturally, there was interest in the welfare of rescuers, and the so-called 'macho' image became too easy and cheap a target. The fact is that many ofthe divers and police officers had had considerable experience of dealing with some ofthe less savoury aspects of life and were fairly hardened individuals. This does not mean that they were supermen or that they were not distressed by some oftheir experiences, but it is important that acknowledgment should be given to the ability of such individuals to deal with difficult circumstances. Illtimed and ill-conceived offers to 'counsel' them merely hardened their resolve to deal with matters their own way2.
Conclusion
A major risk is that we become preoccupied with the bleakest and most harrowing features of a disaster. Nothing can hide the sorrow and suffering, but professionals have a duty to acknowledge the durability and resources individuals have in the face of adversity. Disaster victims cannot 'get back to normal', and they may require much time and support, but the fact is the majority of people do come to terms with what has happened to them. It can also help to identify any good which may have emerged from the tragedy, eg, new relationships, new solutions to problems and lessons learned. One should noteven if one couldforget what happened, but.one has to try to learn from disasters, and resist the sense of helplesness and futility that they provoke. Finally, it is to be hoped that we can learn from major disasters (in which the issues are necessarily cast in-such high relief) in order that we may learn to deal better with the 'disasters' which beset families and individuals as a part of daily living but rarely command much public attention.
About 4 months before the so-called Piper Alpha disaster, a single worker received fatal injuries on the installation, but few people know his name or anything about his widow. Certainly, she was not inundated with offers of help or counselling. If you speak to this widow, however, she will describe the death of her husband as her 'Piper Alpha disaster'.
Who would wish to argue with her?
